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Income-Distribution Concerns In Regulatory Policymaking
Robert D. Willig
Elizabeth E. Bailey
This paper presents and applies new methodological tools for relating
concerns with income distribution to regulatory policymaking. The tools
are based on the concept of social-welfare dominance, according to which
a policy is said to social-welfare-dominate another if it is preferred by all
social decisionmakers who subscribe to a certain set of compelling axioms.
We present a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions for social-
welfare dominance of regulatory policies—conditions that can be tested
by means of market data. We demonstrate the feasibility of this new
approach to normative analysis by means of pilot studies of some policies
toward electric-utility and telephone-service pricing.
Changes in regulatory policies generally benefit some economic agents,
while they hurt others. The standard approach to evaluating such policies
entails aggregating costs and benefits over all agents and using the
algebraic sum as the decision criterion. This methodology views as
equivalent dollars of net benefit, irrespective of to whom they accrue. It
can only be justified by appeal to costless lump-sum transfers or to social
indifference about the distribution of income. In the absence of these
unrealistic conditions, state-of-the-art normative analysis conceptualizes
possibly different welfare weights applied to the net benefits of different
agents. The first section of the article sketches this theoretical development
and argues that the numerical values of such welfare weights are arbitrary
and can be critical for policy assessment.
Consequently, in the second section we develop qualitative relation-
ships among the welfare weights that are equivalent to three axioms:
the Pareto principle, anonymity, and the undesirability of regressive
transfers of real income. These axioms underlie the social-welfare-
dominance relation between policies.
We show that a policy change is social-welfare-dominant if and only
if a series of observable conditions hold. These conditions include the
Hicksian dictum that the total net benefits of the change be positive, as
well as the Rawlsian dictum that the poorest member of society be made
better off. In addition, social-welfare dominance requires the positivity of
the net benefits of each group formed by starting from the bottom and
working up the scale of real income to any level.Willig and Bailey 80
This theory offers a concept of welfare improvement that is far more
general than Pareto optimality. Social-welfare-dominating policies can
have losers as well as gainers. A policy is social-welfare-dominant as long
as losses are counterbalanced by gains to those who are poorer in real
income. Such policies can be formed through political linkages between
efficient and inefficient components. Such pervasive packaging of regula-
tory policies makes little sense when analyzed within the usual optimiza-
tion framework.
The third section presents several additional sets of empirically useful
conditions for social-welfare dominance of policies. For example, if the
aggregate benefit-cost ratio exceeds unity and if the class-specific benefit-
cost ratios decline with income, then the policy change is social-welfare-
dominant. First-order necessary conditions for local non-social-welfare
dominance are developed.
In the fourth section we discuss philosophical stances from which
social-welfare-dominance tools can be utilized in normative and positive
studies. The fifth and sixth sections detail pilot applications to seasonal
peak-load electricity pricing and to the Ramsey pricing of long-distance
telephone services.
Social-Welfare Functions
The current state of the art, by our reading, incorporates income-distribu-
tion concerns into normative analysis by means of a Samuelson-Bergson
social-welfare function (Samuelson 1963). Policy-setting power is viewed
as vested in the hands of a social decisionmaker (SDM). It is assumed that
the SDM acts as if he has a complete and continuous preference ordering
over social states that obeys the Pareto principle. That is, the SDM
respects individual preferences, and views as desirable any change that
improves the lots of some people (by their own values) while leaving all
others indifferent.
For the sake of concreteness, we limit the discussion to social states
that differ only in static, certain allocations of private commodities
among neoclassical consumers. Then, social states are represented by
vectors
(x11,...,Xim,x2i,--.,x2m,---,xnl,...,xnm)eR+ ,
where xtj is the consumption of commodity; by consumer i. The SDM has
a complete and continuous preference ordering over R+
m that is represent-Income-Distribution Concerns 81
able by the ordinal real-valued function V{x), where, for x',x"eR+
m, x is
preferred to x" if and only if F(x') > V{x").
If one assumes that each consumer is indifferent about the consumption
of others (no extended sympathy), the ith neoclassical consumer's prefer-
ences over his own consumptions can be represented by an ordinal,
increasing real-valued utility function, U
l(xn,...,xim). In accordance with
the Pareto principle, the SDM's conditional preference ordering over
vectors (xn,...,xim), with the consumptions of other consumers held con-
stant, must coincide with the ith consumer's preference ordering and must
be independent of the consumptions of others. It follows (Leontief 1947;
Debreu 1960) that the variables xn,...,xim are separable in V(-) from its
other arguments, that [/'(x^,...,*^) can serve as an aggregator of xn,...,





Further, in view of the Pareto principle, <j)( •) is nondecreasing in each of
its arguments and is increasing in some of them.
State-of-the-art normative theory proceeds by assuming that each con-
sumer faces a common vector of prices, p = {p1,...,pm), has income m,-,
and chooses his own consumption bundle (xn,...,xim) to maximize £/'(•)
subject to the budget constraint Z;- xtj Pj < m^ In such a free consumption






IJ(p,m£) is the function giving the market demand for commodity
j by consumer i.
The combination of equations (2) and (1),
V(-) = ^(/
1(p,m1),...,/"(p>mll)) = ^(p;m1,...,mn), (3)
gives the preferences of the SDM over price vectors, p, and distributions
of nominal income, m1,...,mn, induced by his preferences over allocations
of commodities, given the free consumption market. The representation
of social preferences given in equation (3) is in a form theoretically ap-
plicable to the evaluation of microeconomic policy.
1 For example, the
attitudes of the SDM toward changes in regulated prices can be expressed
by means of the tradeoffs between prices that are inherent in the function
\\t. Such tradeoffs are invariant to ordinal transformations of V(-), $(•),
and i//(-). Differentiation of equation (3) givesWillig and Bailey 82
where




Roy's law says that a consumer's rate of substitution between income and
theyth price is that consumer's demand for theyth commodity. Substitut-
ing (5) into (4) gives
ik\ I / 3lk\
(6)
Equation (6) relates the SDM's tradeoff between prices i and j to two
elements:
3 the distribution of demands for goods i and; among consumers
and the collection of weighting factors on these demands,
<w (j> = T-' (7)
c
cmk cmk
Each of the weighting factors measures the marginal social utility, in the
view of the SDM, of income to a consumer.
If the SDM were indifferent to small lump-sum transfers of income be-
tween any two consumers, then all the coks would be equal. This case
would also occur if a costless mechanism for interpersonal lump-sum
transfers were available to the SDM. With cok = a> for all k, equation (6)
would reduce to
Here, the tradeoff between p{ and pj does not depend on the distribution
of demands among consumers. Instead, it is the ratio of total market de-
mands for the goods, which is also the rate of substitution between the
prices for market consumers' surplus.
Generally, however, the SDM will not be costlessly able to effect lump-
sum transfers, will not be indifferent to transfers, and will not impute equal
marginal social utility to each consumer's income. In this case, equationIncome-Distribution Concerns 83
(6) shows that the larger cok is relative to the other weights, the more im-
portant is the demand pattern of consumer k for the SDM's view of price
tradeoffs. If consumers differ in their demand patterns, then the relative
sizes of the weights can become critical for the SDM's decisions on policies
affecting prices.
Economic theory can shed little light on the sizes of the welfare weights.
Some analysts (for example, Feldstein [1972a] and Atkinson [1970]) have
specified functional forms for the behavior of \jj(•) with respect to m1;...,
mn, and have thus implicitly related the full set of weights to a small set of
parameters. However, such procedures are inherently arbitrary. Concep-
tually, it may be empirically or experimentally possible to determine the
\\i function of an SDM, and to proceed to policy analysis on that basis.
Such a tack is yet to be carried out successfully.
Here we shall proceed by using the fact that if the SDM would rather
not see income transferred from consumer i to ;, then ojj < wt. With t
representing such a transfer, the SDM's preferences are represented by
Then
n ^ d<t> , dl* , dV ^ m
at orrii v
mj
and, at t = 0, co,- > Wj.
We specify intuitive conditions on the SDM's preferences that are
equivalent to such inequalities among the welfare weights, and then ask
whether a policy is preferred to another for all weights satisfying the
qualitative relationships. Thus, we avoid the need for quantitatively speci-
fied weights, while we lose completeness of the preference ordering among
policies. The result is a partial ordering that was named social-welfare
dominance by Willig and McCabe (1977).
Social-Welfare Dominance
In this section we characterize the social-welfare-dominance partial
ordering over policies. One policy social-welfare-dominates another if it is
preferred by all SDMs whose social preferences satisfy the three axioms
below.
4 (The axioms are expressed in terms of the premises described
above: static, riskless allocations of private goods among neoclassical
consumers who face a free market without extended sympathy.)Willig and Bailey 84
Axiom 1 (Pareto Principle) The SDM is indifferent to a change that
leaves all consumers indifferent. The SDM does not view as desirable a
change that no consumer finds desirable. A change that is beneficial to at
least one consumer while leaving all others indifferent is viewed as desir-
able by the SDM.
Axiom 2 (Anonymity) At prices p°, the SDM is indifferent to a reversal
of nominal incomes between any two consumers.
Axiom 3 (Regressive Transfer Aversion) At prices p°, the SDM does not
find desirable any transfer of income from a nominally poorer to a richer
consumer.
In our context, axiom 1 implies that the social preferences of the SDM
can be represented by the function of indirect utility levels, cj), defined in
equation (3). Because of the forms of axioms 2 and 3, it is convenient to
work with the special indirect utility functions, ^
fc(p° p,mfc), which are
measured in terms of real income, base p°. These income-compensation





They give the nominal income required by consumer k, in facing prices
p°, to be indifferent to income mk at prices p.
When viewed as a function of p and mfc,^
fc(p°|p,mfc) is a proper indirect
utility function for consumer k. This can be seen from equation (9). Be-
cause the function l
k is increasing in its income argument for fixed p°, the
left-hand side of (9) is an ordinal transformation of the function //. Thus,
l
k( •) is an ordinal transformation of the function pi






Now, for each k, substitute (10) into (3) and define
W(zu...,zn) = 4>{T\z,),..., T
n(zn)).
Then,
ijj(v;mi,...,mn) = ^V|P^iX---^"(P°|p,<>) (11)
yields a particularly convenient representation of the SDM's preferences.Income-Distribution Concerns 85
Of course, by axiom 1, W( •) is nondecreasing in all of its arguments and
increasing in at least one.
Axiom 2 says that at prices p° it is only the vector of nominal incomes,
and not their assignment to particular consumers, that matters to the
SDM. Thus, il/(p°;ml,...,mn) is symmetric in its income arguments. For
example,
iA(p°;m1,m2,m3,...,mJ = iA(po;m2,m1,m3,...,mM).
Note from (9) that
/AP°|P°,mfc) = mk. (12)
It follows from (12) and (11) that
= W(mlt...,mJ. (13)
Consequently, axioms 1 and 2 together imply that W( •) is symmetric in its
arguments. This has been established by reference to prices p°, where
H
k = mk; it holds as well for other prices where the arguments of W(-)
are/(p°|p,mk).
By axiom 3 and equation (8),
5 m,- > m,- implies that, at prices p°,
di]/ d\jj




This is a property of the function W(-), whatever the interpretation of




3 implies —r < —-j. (14)
dfi dfi
J
Now, consider the social-welfare comparison between policies p' and
p" that result in (p';m\,...,m'n) and (p";m'i,...,m^') respectively.
Definition
p' social-welfare-dominates p" (p' > p") if p' is preferred to p" by all
SDMs whose preferences satisfy axioms 1-3.Willig and Bailey 86
Theorem 1
p' > p" if and only if
t /AP°|p'X) > t /APVX), k=l,...,n, (15)
where the indices i are assigned to possibly different consumers under p'
and p" so that
and (16)
(This theorem, proved below, is mathematically analogous to results
established by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1973]. A more general version was
demonstrated by Willig and McCabe [1977].)
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose that equation (15) is satisfied. We must
prove that it follows that p' is preferred to p" by any SDM who satisfies
axioms 1-3. Let the SDM's social preferences be represented as in (13). By
axiom 2, the consumers can be relabeled to satisfy (16) without changing
the relevant values of W{-). For notational convenience, let Z- =
^'(P^P'JW-), let Z" = n
l(p°\p",m'{), and let Z' and Z" be the corresponding
vectors. Define, with t a scalar, F(t) = W((l — t)Z' + tZ"). Then, using
the mean-value theorem,




Since the components of Z' and Z" are ordered in an increasing fashion,
so too are the components of (1 — I) Z' + TZ". Then, by axioms 1 and
3 and equation (14),
oil> OJ2> ••• > con > 0,Income-Distribution Concerns 87
where
_ dW{{\ - t)Z' + tZ")
1 ~ dz
Using this notation, it follows from algebraic manipulation that
w{Z") - w{T) = "f (W - cok+1)i(z'i - zd) + a)n£(z'i - z;.).
By equation (15), I*=1 (Z" - ZJ) > 0 for fc=l,...,n. Also,
(cok — cofc+1) > 0. Let; be the largest index such that col = co2 = ... = a)j.
If; = n,then«n > 0 by axiom 1 and W{Z") - W(Z') = a>nT.
ni=l(Z
r; - Z[)
> 0. If j < n, then co} - coJ+l > 0 and W{Z") - W(Z') > (wj - coJ+l)
S/=1 (Z'i - Z'i) > 0. Thus, W(Z") - W(Z') > 0 for any SDM in the class.
For the other direction of proof, assume that p' > p". With consumers
ordered according to relations (16), let W(Z) = Zf=1 Zv Such preferences
clearly satisfy axiom 1. At p°, Z, = mh and axiom 2 is immediate.
Consider a transfer of y > 0 from i to j with i < j, and let G(y) be the
resulting level of W(). If i < k and; > k, then G(j) = G(0) - }7 < G(0).
If i > k, j > k, and rrii — y > mk, then G(y) = G(0), whereas if mf — y
< mk, then G(y) = G(0) - (mfc - mt + y) < G(0). If i <j < k and
nij + y < mk+1, then G()/) = G(0). If i < j < k and m,- + y > mfc+1,
then G(y) = G(0) - (m,- + 3; - mk+1) < G(0). Thus, W^(Z) = Sf=1 Z£
satisfies axioms 1-3 for any k and, for dominance, (15) must hold. Q.E.D.
To interpret theorem 1, note first that in the situations caused by each
policy, consumers are relabeled so that consumer 1 is poorer in real
income (base p°) than is 2, who is poorer than 3, and so on. This is permis-
sible, loosely, by virtue of the anonymity axiom. If moving from p' to p"
does not change the order of consumers' real incomes, then the consumer
indexed by i is the same in both situations.
The inequalities in equation (15) say that the sum of the real incomes of
the poorest k consumers under p' must, for dominance, exceed that
under p" for all k. For k = 1, equation (15) is the Rawlsian condition that
the lot of the poorest consumer be improved. For k = n, equation (15)
is the Hicksian condition that the sum of the changes in all consumers'
real incomes be positive. The novelty and strength of equation (15) is
that the condition is required for k = l,for/c = n, and for all k in between.
It is important to realize that the conditions given in (15) can be checked
by means of market data. It was shown by Willig (1973, 1976) thatWillig and Bailey 88
jw(p°|p,m) is approximated closely by the sum of m and the Marshallian
consumer's surplus area (a line integral for multiple price changes)
between p° and p, if that area is a relatively small portion of m and if
the income elasticities of demand are in the usual range. Under such
conditions, (15) can be investigated with only small errors by means of
sums of consumers' incomes and surpluses. In particular, if m\ = m",
then a sum of the form
can be well approximated by the sum of the poorest (in real income) k
consumers' surpluses between p" and p'. This sum is independent of p°,
if the identities of the relevant consumers are independent of p°.
Thus—loosely, or precisely in terms of approximations with well-
understood bounds—equation (15) has the following interpretation: A
necessary condition for social-welfare dominance is passage of the stan-
dard aggregate (k = n) consumers' surplus test. The necessary and
sufficient conditions for social-welfare dominance are that the policy
change increase the aggregated surpluses of the poorest k consumers,
for all k.
Of course, in an actual economy, the number of conditions represented
by equation (15) is staggeringly large. For practical analysis, it may
suffice to partition consumers into a manageable number of income
classes, to consider as identical the welfare weights of all consumers
within a class, and to apply theorem 1 across classes rather than strictly
across consumers. We present below several more easily verified con-
ditions that are either necessary or sufficient for dominance. But let us
momentarily digress on the subject of policy packages.
Consider a policy p' that does not dominate the status-quo policy,
p°. Denote
AZ,. = //(P°|P'X) - AP°\p°,m?) (17)
as the change in the ith consumer's real income due to the policy, measured
against the status-quo base. Then, for at least some k,
k
£ AZ; < 0.
Suppose that p' is efficient in the usual sense in that it increases total
surplus:Income-Distribution Concerns
l AZ; > 0.
[=1
Then, there may exist an ancillary policy change that, when linked with
p'', makes the policy package dominate the status quo. Such an ancillary
change need not itself dominate the status quo, and the policy package
need not dominate p'. Moreover, the ancillary change may be an inefficient
addition to p' in that it decreases the gain in aggregate surplus that could
have been achieved by p' alone.
6
Thus, the concept of social-welfare dominance can provide a framework
for understanding the common regulatory and political process of linking
policies together into packages. Such practices have no rationale when
analyzed within the usual optimization framework.
Tests for Dominance
To make possible the use of differential analysis, suppose that there are h
continuous policy controls, 9l,...,9h, that are restricted by the feasibility
condition that F{9) > 0.
7 Let the status quo be represented by 6°, with
F{9°) = 0. Further, let the real income (base p°) of consumer i be given by
ZM where Z,(0°) < ZJ + 1(0°).
Proposition 1 There exists a feasible policy in the direction V from 9°
that social-welfare-dominates the status quo 9° if
f
 k 1
VF(9°)-V>0 and £ VZ,.(0°) • V > 0, k=l,...,n, (18)
| J
where either Ztf
0) < Zi+1{9°) or, if Z£(0°) = Zi+1{9
0),
8 there is a i such
° ° for 0 < t < i.
Proof of Proposition 1 The functions oft, F(9°+ tV), and Sf=1 Z,-(0°+ tV)
all have positive derivatives with respect to t, at t — 0, if relations (18)
hold. Then, there is a i such that for 0 < t < i,
F{9° + tV) > F(9°) = 0
and
i = 1 i = 1Willig and Bailey 90
For positive t sufficiently small,
Zt{e
0 + tV) < Zi+1(6° + tV)
and 6 = 6° + tV is a feasible policy that dominates the status quo.
Proposition 1 shows that if local analysis uncovers a feasible domina-
ting direction of policy movement, then there is a feasible dominating
policy change that is a finite step in that direction.
Gordon's theorem (Mangasarian 1969) provides a condition that is
equivalent to (18) and that is computationally efficient by linear program-
ing methods.
Proposition 2 Relations (18) hold if and only if there is no non-negative,
nonzero vector y with
Equation (19) has the same form as the first-order conditions for 9° to
be Pareto-optimal for the n "pseudoconsumers," each of whom is the
aggregate of the k poorest actual consumers (k = 1,2,...,n). Such an
approach could be used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
6° to be locally nondominated. However, this tack would require curva-
ture conditions on the functions that are not compelling at this level of
generality.
The following mathematical result, proved in Willig and McCabe 1977,
is useful in conjunction with Proposition 1 or, directly, with Theorem 1.
Lemma Let F(m) be an increasing function for 0 < m < m. Suppose
g(m)dF(m) > 0. (20)
Let g(m) = b(m) - c(m), with b(m) > (0), c(m) > 0, and with b(m)/c(m)
a decreasing function of m for 0 < m < m. Then
g(m)dF(m) > 0 for 0 < m < m. (21)
To apply this lemma to theorem 1, consider a policy move that generates
the changes in real income AZt, where the indexes of consumers increase
with real income. We can interpret F(i) as the cumulative (step) density
function of consumers, and g(i) as AZt. Then, g(i) = b(i) — c(i) is a benefit-Income-Distribution Concerns 91
cost decomposition of the net change in real income, and the lemma
establishes the result given in theorem 2.
Theorem 2 A policy move that does not alter the ranking of consumers
by real income is social-welfare-dominating if its aggregate net benefit is
positive and if it has benefit-cost ratios specific to real income classes that
decrease with real income.
Combining the lemma with proposition 1 yields the local test for a
dominating policy given as theorem 3.
Theorem 3 With consumers indexed as in proposition 1, there exists a
feasible policy in the direction V from 9° that social-welfare-dominates





and if there exist b{ > 0 and c{ > 0 such that
WZi(6°)-V = bi-ci
and bjci decreases with i.
Theorems 2 and 3 focus attention on benefit-cost ratios that are specific to
real income classes of consumers. If these ratios decline with real income
for a policy change that leaves intact the ordering of consumers by real
income, then the move is social-welfare-dominant if and only if it is efficient
in the standard aggregate sense. This result can be useful when data are
insufficient for the calculations required by theorem 1 but qualitative
information indicates the relationship between income levels and income-
class-specific benefit-cost ratios.
Additional tests that are more useful in a different context are discussed
in McCabe and Willig 1977.
Positive and Normative Views
Suppose an analyst observes that an SDM has effected a policy move that
has resulted in real-income changes, AZ{, that fail to satisfy equations (15)Willig and Bailey 92
and (16). The move can certainly not be logically criticized on those
grounds, even by believers in axioms 1-3. It is possible that the chosen
policy was optimal for the SDM's particular preferences, and that those
preferences satisfy the axioms. However, a believer in axioms 1-3 would
have grounds for protest if the SDM's choice revealed a decision criterion
in conflict with the axioms. The inverse of theorem 1 yields the means for
such revelation.
Proposition 3 A policy change is weakly preferred by no social prefer-
ences that obey axioms 1-3, if and only if the — AZ; satisfy (15) and (16);
that is, if and only if the original policy social-welfare-dominates the new
one.
What cogent aspersions may be cast at an SDM who has, with full in-
formation, effected a dominated policy? The pros and cons of such argu-
ments are best organized around the defining axioms.
It can be argued that public policy regularly violates the Pareto prin-
ciple via promotion of merit goods, legally mandatory insurance pro-
grams, paternalistic safety rules, legal restrictions on private conduct,
and the like. Counterarguments assert that such violations of axiom 1 are
in fact Pareto-optimal policies in the face of overlooked externalities, im-
perfect information, and extended sympathy. The only conclusion that
can be drawn here is that without such potentially important complica-
tions, imposition on consumers of an SDM's personal tastes is socially
counterproductive.
Violations of axiom 2 seem to indicate favoritism based on factors
omitted from the explicit normative analysis. The deliberately simple
model utilized here does omit many characteristics of individual con-
sumers that might well be included in the evaluation of real income.
Among these characteristics could be labor ability, wealth, physical and
human capital, health, and family size. Thus, at prices p°, an SDM might
reasonably fail to be indifferent to an interchange of nominal incomes
between people whose states of health do not coincide. These matters are
given a detailed treatment in Willig 1981, where it is shown that the
conditions (15) and (16) can remain robust to such interpersonal differences
when the axioms are suitably broadened.
Favoritism in violation of axiom 2 can also be motivated by reciprocal
opportunities for the personal financial or political enrichment of the
SDM. It is hoped that such violations can be uncovered by the social-
welfare-dominance methodology.Income-Distribution Concerns 93
The content of axiom 3 depends on the definition of real income. In a
more general model than that presented here, real income could include
adjustments for abnormal levels of selected characteristics and endow-
ments. Then, for example, in theorem 1, consumer 1 would have the
smallest adjusted real income, and the real-income ordering of consumers
would depend partially on the set of characteristics for which adjustments
are permitted. In this way, the conditions for social-welfare dominance
would become less mechanical, less scientific, and more responsive to
difficult ethical judgments. Revealed violations of axiom 3 must be viewed
in this light. However, there remain wide classes of social-decisionmaking
behavior that would fail to satisfy any ethically reasonable version of the
axiom. For example, an SDM who acted to maximize his political support
or personal finances (see Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) would undoubtedly
exhibit many instances of preference for policies that are inefficient in the
aggregate and that cause regressive transfers of real income. Such be-
havior can be exposed by analysis based on proposition 3.
In our view, the methodologies presented here can systematically reflect
income-distribution concerns in regulatory policymaking. Past regulatory
decisions can be reviewed for efficiency and distribution effects within the
framework provided by theorem 1 and proposition 3. To narrow the
present sets of options, social-welfare-dominated policies can be excluded
from consideration with analyses based on proposition 1 or 2 or on
theorem 2 or 3. These same methods can underlie a discovery that a
regulatory status quo is social-welfare-dominated. Finally, the distribu-
tional effects of an innovative policy can be tested and summarized by
means of the conceptual tools forged here.
The remaining sections of this article present pilot applications of social-
welfare-dominance methods to regulatory policymaking.
Peak and Off-Peak Pricing by Electric Utilities
Until recently, electric utilities in the United States rarely charged differen-
tial rates by time of day or by season of the year. Yet, these utilities face
demands that exhibit definite peaks and troughs. Electric utilities in the
southern and southwestern states, for example, face peaks during the
summer months, caused in large part by summer demand for air condi-
tioning. Under seasonal pricing, such an electric utility can cut down the
need for additional capacity by instituting a summer surcharge, and can
encourage a more efficient utilization of capacity throughout the year by
also offering a winter discount. These well-known advantages of peak-Willig and Bailey 94
load pricing policies have proved to be of substantial economic impor-
tance in Europe (Mitchell and Acton 1977).
There is an additional aspect of peak-load pricing that is important in
the United States. Public-utility commissioners, who are responsible for
approving such policies, often have an interest in the income-distribution
consequences of these policies. If seasonal pricing were to have equalizing
distributional effects (as may be expected in the case of summer-peaking
electric utilities), then commissioners might be particularly disposed to
encourage this policy. In contrast, if seasonal pricing were likely to have
an adverse effect on low-income families (as may occur in the case of
winter-peaking electrics), there would then be hesitation about approval
of the policy unless other benefits could be shown to be substantial.
Therefore, as a first application, we examine the income-distribution
consequences of a switch from a pricing structure that is uniform through-
out the year to one that takes account of seasonal peaks. Since our intent
is to illustrate how to test for the existence of a social-welfare-dominant
policy, we confine the discussion to a very simple structure in which a
summer-peaking electric utility increases its summer block prices by s and
decreases its winter block prices by w.
9 We presume that, under the status
quo, the seasonally uniform prices exceed marginal cost during the off-
peak winter months and are below marginal cost during the summer peak.
Thus, we assume that implementation of small positive changes s and w
is a move toward marginal-cost pricing that increases aggregate con-
sumers'-plus-producer's surplus.
In the absence of data on demand elasticities, marginal costs, and the
ownership of the electric utility, we cannot quantify the effects of price
changes on the utility's profit and on the incomes of its owners. Thus, we
focus on the welfare effects of various price changes on the consumers of
the utility's outputs. We proceed with this pilot application by inves-
tigating the income-distribution effects of price changes as if they held
the utility's profit constant and had welfare effects on only electricity
consumers.
Our data consist of the monthly 1973 electricity usages of the 49 repre-
sentative households in Gainesville, Florida studied by Roth (1976).
Twenty of the households were classified as low-income, 18 as middle-
income, and 11 as high-income. The data for households in each income
class are summarized in table 2.1 for the summer months (June-Septem-
ber) and for the rest of the year. Note that, while total summer usage is less
than total winter usage, monthly output is higher during the peak summer
period than it is during the winter.Income-Distribution Concerns 95
Table 2.1 Income-distribution consequences of seasonal pricing of electricity, based on
data of Roth (1976).
Number of households
Average 1970 income
Average 1973 usage, June-Sept.
Average 1973 usage, Oct.-May
Total 1973 usage, June-Sept.
Total 1973 usage, Oct.-May



















































a. r = Winter price decrease per kWh/Summer price increase per kWh.
The welfare effects of specific changes of w and s can be analyzed by
means of consumers'-surplus methods. However, we lack the requisite
monthly demand function for each income class. Consequently, guided by
proposition 1, we proceed with local analysis of directions of change in
w and s from 0.
If we take the then-current set of prices as the base for real incomes,
the derivative of a consumer's 1973 real income with respect to w, evaluated
at 0, is his winter 1973 electricity consumption, and that with respect to
s is minus his summer 1973 consumption. Thus, with the relative winter
and summer price changes denoted by r = dw/ds, the rate of change in
real income for a particular consumer is
A7
—— = r x (Winter consumption) — (Summer consumption) ds
,„,. x • \( Summer consumption\
= (Winter consumption) r —— —.— ).
\ Winter consumption I
(22)
The ratio of the benefits from the winter price decrease to the costs from
the summer price increase is
dZ/dw dw
dZ/ds ds = r x
Winter consumption
Summer consumption
(23)Willig and Bailey 96
Because Roth aggregated his sample of households into three income
classes, we can only take the point of view that the welfare weights are the
same for all households within the same class. We then consider that
axioms 1-3 apply to the different income classes.
Equations (22) and (23) show that the income-distribution effects of
price changes in the ratio r depend upon the relative winter and summer
consumption of electricity by each of the three income classes. If, for
example, relative seasonal consumption were the same for all classes, then,
regardless of the absolute levels of usage, the price changes would be dis-
tributionally neutral. In particular, the benefit-cost ratio would be iden-
tical for each income group.
However, the data displayed in table 2.1 reveal patterns of electricity
usage that are very different among income classes. The low-income house-
holds have rather equal usage throughout the year, and hence their ratio
of consumption during the four summer months to that during the eight
winter months is 0.51. The middle-income households use about 50
percent more electricity than the low-income consumers during the winter,
but almost three times more in the summer period, presumably because
they employ air conditioning. Their ratio of summer to winter usage is
1.03. The high-income households use substantially more electricity than
the middle-income consumers throughout the year. Perhaps because they
use electric heating in addition to air conditioning, their ratio of summer
to winter consumption (0.89) is smaller than that of the middle-income
group.
Combining equation (22) with the summer-winter usage ratios shows
that if r (the ratio of winter price decrease to summer price increase) ex-
ceeds 1.03, then all income classes of consumers will benefit. However,
such a large relative price decrease may cause infeasible losses for the
utility company.
The normative methodology presented here shows that more moderate
decreases in the winter price, relative to the summer price, would social-
welfare-dominate the status quo, provided that they did not decrease
vendor profit. Following the prescription of proposition 1, we can sum
equation (22) over the low and middle income classes and over all three
classes. The corresponding aggregated summer-winter usage ratios are
0.808 and 0.846, respectively. For r > 0.846, the low-income group, the
low-income together with the middle-income group, and all groups of
consumers aggregated together gain.
1
0 Thus, by proposition 1, for any
feasible r greater than 0.846 there is a set of price changes in that ratioIncome-Distribution Concerns 97
whose effects on consumers would be desirable in the view of any SDM
whose preferences satisfy axioms 1-3.
Of course, for 1.03 > r > 0.846, a move toward peak-load pricing that
would leave profit constant would social-welfare-dominate but would
not Pareto-dominate the status quo, because the middle- and high-income
groups would lose. However, for such a policy, their losses would be
smaller than the gains to the low-income households, and the move would
be desirable under axiom 3. Table 2.1 displays these gains and losses for
r = 0.846, scaled by setting s = $0.01.
To illustrate the discussion of the preceding section, we note that for
0.846 > r > 0.51 the peak-load pricing policy decreases the aggregate
real income of electricity consumers and fails to social-welfare-dominate
the status quo. Yet, such changes benefit the low-income group and may
be desirable to some SDMs who satisfy axioms 1-3. In contrast, for
r < 0.51, the price changes are social-welfare-dominated by the status
quo. The analysis suggests that if such a policy was carried out under stable
production costs, the SDM was either misinformed or deliberately ignor-
ing consumers' interests.
Welfare-Optimal Pricing of Long-Distance Telephone Services
The next policy we evaluate is a set of price changes in the direction that
yields the best local improvement in aggregate welfare, given that the net
revenue
1
1 from the studied group of services remains unchanged. The
specific example involves 1973 long-distance telephone prices in the United
States.
Our work with this example began with a pilot study of the 1973 price
structure of direct-distance-dialed (DDD) telephone services (Willig and
Bailey 1977b). The study sought to determine whether these prices satisfied
first-order conditions for welfare optimization under the constraint that
net revenues be held at the then-current level.
The relevant first-order conditions with equal welfare weights for all
consumers, no external effects, and no cross-elasticities are given by the
inverse elasticity rule:
x g. = a? for all ^ (24)
a
where et, Ph and MCt are the elasticity, price, and marginal cost of service
i, respectively. The at are Ramsey numbers.
1
2 The Ramsey rule states that,
from service to service, the percentage deviation of price from marginalWillig and Bailey 98














Figure 2.1 Rough experimental data on price, marginal cost, and elasticity for 1973 DDD
services.
cost times the price elasticity of demand should be constant. The more
unresponsive the demand for a product to changes in its price, the less
welfare is lost if that price is increased, and so the larger the optimal devia-
tion between price and marginal cost. Thus, the overhead expenses for
services produced with economies of scale are best covered with revenues
from the more inelastic of the services.
The two components of the inverse elasticity formula are displayed in
figure 2.1 for day, evening, and night/weekend calls for each of 21 mileage
bands (short-haul to long-haul). The price variable is the revenue from a
call of average duration. The price elasticity and marginal cost for each
distance and time-of-day element of the DDD schedule are calculated
from rough, experimental pre-1973 data,
1
3 on which we performed a
number of interpolations.
It is readily seen that day calls had the largest relative markup of priceIncome-Distribution Concerns 99
Short Long
Mileage Bands
Figure 2.2 Critical Ramsey numbers for direct-distance dialing in 1973, determined from
experimental data by the economic-gradient method with the Euclidean metric.
over marginal cost for any given mileage band, and the lowest elasticities.
Inversely, evening calls had the lowest relative deviation of price from
marginal cost and the highest elasticities. These qualitative relationships
are in accord with equation (24). However, across mileage bands, the long-
haul calls had both the highest relative markup of price over marginal
cost and the highest elasticities. These qualitative directions violate the
dictum of equation (24).
Figure 2.2 shows a plot of Ramsey numbers calculated from the experi-
mental data for the DDD services. It is evident that these data suggest that
the 1973 prices of day, evening, and night/weekend telephone services
classified by length of haul do not satisfy equation (24), as the Ramsey
numbers do not all coincide. Instead there is a systematic bias, with low
Ramsey numbers in short mileage bands and large Ramsey numbers in
the longer mileage bands, and with larger Ramsey numbers for evening
and night calls than for day calls for almost, all of the mileage bands.
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Figure 2.3 Best directions of price change, with greatest price change equal to 100 percent
(based on experimental data).
about the functional forms for demands and costs. In particular, we sup-
posed that the marginal cost of a unit of any service remains unchanged
throughout the relevant range, and that demands either were linear or had
constant elasticity. Though we had no assurance that these functional
forms spanned the likely cases, we felt they might yield information con-
cerning the closeness of the 1973 prices to those that would have been
optimal at that time. Unfortunately, we found that these assumptions
about demand and cost curves led to calculated price increases in the
shortest mileage bands of day calls that were so large in percentage terms
that they undermined the credibility of our assumptions for the range of
price changes indicated. We did, however, calculate the size of the welfare
improvement under these assumptions, and found that the change in total
welfare was small when viewed as a percentage of the total consumers'
surplus from, or the total consumers' expenditures on, these services.
To circumvent the difficulties in determining global functional forms
for demands and costs, we applied the economic-gradient method (Willig
and Bailey 1977a). This method determines the feasible direction of price
change that is locally optimal from data on demands, costs, elasticities,Income-Distribution Concerns 101
and marginal costs at the current point of operation. It also requires the
specification of a metric to measure the sizes of sets of price changes.
Figure 2.2 displays the critical Ramsey number, a*, determined by the
economic-gradient method with the Euclidean metric. The best feasible
direction entails decreases in the prices of services with Ramsey numbers
above the critical line, and inversely. Figure 2.3 shows the price changes
that result from a specific move in the locally best direction,
1
4 a move that
is normalized to make the largest percentage change in a single price equal
to 100 percent. All short-haul prices increase, long-haul prices decrease,
night/weekend prices remain relatively unchanged, day prices generally
rise, and evening prices generally fall. The largest percentage change is in
the price of the shortest-distance day calls.
Welfare analysis showed that, while not substantial, the rate of change
in total consumers' surplus with respect to the size of price changes in this
best local direction was significantly positive. Our initial conjecture about
the income-distribution consequences of these price changes was that
they would produce regressive transfers of real income. We supposed this
because it seemed to us that richer households would place a higher
proportion of their calls on the long-haul routes. However, the data did
not confirm this conjecture.
Figure 2.4 displays data from AT&T's Market Research Information
System (MRIS) on relative usage patterns of the lowest income class and
a middle-income group. Surprisingly, the patterns are very similar, and
thus it appears on the basis of this evidence that pricing of these services
might be distributionally neutral. Table 2.2 summarizes usage patterns by
time of day for all the income groups. It is clear that the richer households
placed a larger proportion of their calls during the day rate period and a
smaller proportion during the night/weekend rate period. Consequently,
Table 2.2 Distribution of telephone traffic by income class and rate period: 1973 MRIS
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of telephone traffic by income class, mileage band, and time of
day. Solid line represents <$3,000 income class; dotted line represents $10,000-$ 14,999
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a pricing policy that would increase the off-peak discount for nights and
weekends would yield relatively larger benefits to poorer households.
Making use of the MRIS data on demand patterns by income class, we
applied the method suggested by Theorem 3 to price changes in the locally
best direction. By construction, this direction is feasible in that it maintains
the status-quo level of net revenues. Also, local movement of prices in this
optimal direction is guaranteed to increase total surplus. Thus, the first
two conditions of theorem 3 are satisfied. To check the third, we defined
the benefits to be the relative price decreases times initial quantities, and
the costs to be the relative price increases times initial quantities. Table
2.3 summarizes the resulting benefit-cost ratios for the sample households.
The differences in the rate-period-specific ratios among income classes
reflect the differing distributions of calls among mileage bands. Sur-
prisingly, these ratios show that the very poorest households place a
greater proportion of their calls on the longest routes and a smaller propor-
tion on the shortest routes than do other households. This pattern is most
pronounced during the discounted evening and night/weekend rate
periods.
All classes suffer from the increases in day rates and benefit from the
general increase in the offpeak discounts. The total benefit-cost ratios
generally decrease with income, owing to the fact (documented in table
2.2) that poorer consumers place a smaller fraction of their calls during
the day rate period, which bears the brunt of the price increases. Most
striking, however, is the result that all the total benefit-cost ratios substan-
tially exceed 1. This suggests that the policy of changing prices in the
locally best direction results in a significant Pareto improvement for
residential consumers by income class.
There is an apparent contradiction between this finding and our earlier
observation that the total net benefits from large price changes to a cal-
culated Ramsey optimum were not substantial. This contradiction can
be resolved by recognizing that the data underlying the Ramsey analysis
include both business and residential calls. Although we do not have
explicit information on relative proportions of business and residential
calls over the various mileage and time-of-day categories, we do know
that business calls are concentrated during the day. Thus, the substantial
price increases for this category of calls probably mean that the business
class as a whole will lose from the policy. As these losses are passed on to
consumers in the form of increased product prices or declines in the values
of securities, much of the immediate welfare gain to consumers will be
dissipated.Willig and Bailey 104
Table 2.3 Benefits and costs of price changes in the locally best direction for social welfare:

















































It seems plausible, moreover, that these losses will fall more heavily on
richer households than on poor ones. To the extent that business outlays
for telephone calls are overhead costs rather than marginal costs, and to
the extent that consumer-goods prices move with marginal rather than
with average costs, the losses in business telephone consumers' surplus
will decrease profits rather than be passed through to households in the
form of higher consumer-goods prices. Such declines in profit would
undoubtedly affect richer individuals more than proportionately.
If this were the case, then the income-class-specific benefit-cost ratios
resulting from the full effects of the price changes would be smaller than
those shown in table 2.3, but it is plausible that they would be declining
with income. Further, the aggregate net benefits would be positive by the
construction of the price changes. Then, theorem 3 would enable us to
infer from our crude data and assumptions that there existed a set of
regulated price movements in the locally best direction that social-welfare-
dominated the then-current status quo.
Conclusion
We have presented a variety of necessary and sufficient conditions for
social-welfare dominance of regulatory policies—conditions that can be
tested by means of market data. In our study of electricity pricing, we
showed that the entire gamut of policy conclusions could be spanned by
varying the relative levels of winter and summer prices. In the study of
long-distance-telephone pricing we showed that, contrary to our expec-
tations, a move in the locally best direction might have satisfied the
monotonicity requirement of theorem 3 and might thus have been social-Income-Distribution Concerns 105
welfare-dominant. Our discussion of these specific pricing policies has
served to demonstrate the workability of our new approach, and to high-
light the usefulness of the concept of social-welfare dominance.
It gives us pleasure to thank Jim McCabe for his critical contributions, Glenn Loury for
many stimulating conversations on this subject, and W. J. Baumol and R. Schmalensee
for their helpful editorial suggestions.
Notes
1. This approach was taken most recently by Broadway (1976).
2. Katzner 1970 gives a clear treatment and the original references.
3. This approach to normative analysis of pricing is due to Feldstein (1972b).
4. The choice of these axioms was inspired by the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1973) analysis of
nominal income inequality. Their axioms are extended here to carefully defined measures
of real incomes. Yet more general versions of the axioms are studied in Willig and McCabe
1977.
5. Here, for convenience, we assume that i// and W are differentiable. The development in
Willig and McCabe 1977 dispenses with this assumption.
6. These possibilities are analogous to the case of a risk-averse investor who seeks securities
with returns that are negatively correlated with the returns on his portfolio. Such an investor
will gladly give up some aggregate mean return in order to reduce the risk of his total holdings.
7. This scalar constraint can be easily replaced, as is shown below, by a vector of constraints.
8. We are grateful to R. Schmalensee for pointing out that the case of ties in real income
requires special treatment.
9. This illustration is far simpler than the policies being studied in a number of current
electricity-pricing experiments (see, for example, CPUCA 1977 and Manning et al. 1976),
but the principles developed here can be readily adapted to more complex cases.
10. These numerical results are sensitive to the numbers of households in each income
class. For example, had there been 5 low-income, 72 middle-income, and 11 high-income
households, the policy for which r = 1 would have been beneficial in the aggregate but
would have failed to social-welfare-dominate the status quo.
11. Net revenue = total revenue — (sum of marginal costs x quantities).
12. These are named for Frank Ramsey, who first derived this rule in the context of optimal
taxation. See Baumol and Bradford 1970 for a discussion of the rule and its history.
13. Consequently, the elasticities and marginal costs do not reflect post-1973 price levels,
production technologies, and potentially competitive market structures. Further, to facili-
tate this pilot study, we assume that there are zero cross-elasticities among the studied
categories of calls, that changes in the prices under consideration do not affect the net
revenues from other categories of calls, and that the durations of calls do not change en-
dogenously. Without these somewhat unrealistic assumptions, the conditions for Ramsey
optimality are more complicated than equation (24).
14. Of course, the calculated locally best feasible direction depends crucially on the use
of the inverse elasticity rule and on the magnitudes assigned to its variables. Thus, the
quantitative and qualitative price movements displayed in figure 2.3 have no more validity
than do the underlying data and the assumptions detailed in n.13.Willig and Bailey 106
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Alvin K. Klevorick
Students of public regulation have developed a number of competing
theories about the interactions between regulated firms and regulatory
agencies and about the social effects of those interactions. The paper
I am to discuss represents an output of regulator/regulatee cooperation
that differs in kind from the outputs discussed by most of those theories.
(Admittedly, though, the interaction that generated this paper does not
fit the typical situation considered in these theories, since the regulator
from the CAB does not regulate Bell Labs!) Willig and Bailey have pro-
duced an interesting, carefully done piece of theoretical and applied work
on an important subject.
The authors present new methodological tools for taking income-
distribution concerns into account in regulatory policymaking. They
also provide pilot applications of these new "social welfare dominance"
methods to regulatory policymaking. The illustrative applications are
interesting in and of themselves, and also indicate how the theoretical
methods developed in the first part of the article might be put to use.
At the same time, the electricity and telephone pricing examples serve to
highlight several basic problems facing any attempt to apply the theo-
retical development in deciding real issues. I shall discuss two of these
problems of implementation and then turn to some questions about the
theoretical results themselves.
First, two of the axioms that underlie the social-welfare-dominance
relation—axiom A2 (anonymity) and axiom A3 (which I shall call
"regressive-transfer aversion")—are stated in the form "At prices p°,
the social decisionmaker...." However, the prices p° are not defined.
These prices constitute the basis for computing real income. In the
seasonal electricity pricing example, Willig and Bailey use the then-
current set of prices as the base for real incomes. Though they do not
say so explicitly, I take it they also use the then-current set of prices as
p° in the long-distance-telephone pricing example. At only one point in
the paper is there a caveat about these base prices: In discussing theorem
1, which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for one policy to
social-welfare-dominate another, the authors note that the partial sum
of the aggregated surpluses of the poorest k consumers is independent ofComment on Willig and Bailey 109
p° "if the identities of the relevant consumers are independent of p°."
But why should those identities be independent of p°?
If the ranking of consumers by real income does depend on the base
prices, we face a substantial (even if traditional) index-number problem.
It would seem to be a serious problem for a methodology put forth to treat
income-distribution concerns that its conclusions are sensitive to the
choice of base prices p°. Application of the tools presented in the Willig-
Bailey paper could indicate that one policy social-welfare-dominates a
second under one set of base prices but that the second policy social
welfare dominates the first under an alternative set of base prices. What
criterion are we to use in choosing the base prices?
A second difficulty an analyst faces in applying the paper's theoretical
results to actual policy issues derives from the level at which the theoretical
development proceeds. The tests for social-welfare dominance presented
in the paper's theorems and propositions are stated in terms of real-
income changes (and benefit-cost ratios) of individual consumers. Bailey
and Willig realize, however, that in practical analysis considerations of
data availability will generally require that consumers be grouped into
a manageable number of income classes; indeed, they use such classes
in their pilot applications. This involves considering as identical the
welfare weights of all consumers within a class and applying the paper's
theoretical results across classes rather than across consumers. But then
a finding that one policy social-welfare-dominates a second may well
depend on the income classes one chooses to use or is forced to use because
of data limitations. At a minimum, some sensitivity analysis of any policy
conclusion should be performed to see whether alternative partitionings
of consumers into income classes yield different conclusions. If grouping
consumers differently does change the ranking of policies according to
the social-welfare-dominance criterion, what policy conclusion should
we draw? How are we to choose the "correct" income-class partition?
Let us turn now to the authors' interpretation of their basic result
(theorem 1) and, specifically, to condition (15), which it imposes on the
real-income changes of the k poorest consumers. Willig and Bailey
suggest that their condition incorporates the Rawlsian dictum that the
poorest member of society be made better off. If we identify Rawls's view
with his difference principle or a maximin social-welfare strategy, then
in a pairwise comparison of policies a Rawlsian would prefer the policy
that improved the lot of the worst-off person. (Philosophers would object
to such a narrow view of Rawls's theory of justice.) Hence, for pairwise
comparisons, the authors' interpretation is strictly correct. But, in theKlevorick 110
context of choosing one policy from a set of many alternatives, there is a
difficulty with viewing the authors' condition as incorporating Rawls's
dictum: From the set of all feasible policies, someone following Rawls's
maximin principle would choose that course which maximized the well-
being of the worst-off person. And that policy need not be a social-
welfare-dominating one; it need not satisfy the conditions in the authors'
theorem 1. This, in fact, provides an illustration of the point Willig and
Bailey make when they present "positive and normative views" of their
theorems and approach. They write: "Suppose an analyst observes that
an SDM has effected a policy move that has resulted in real-income
changes ... that fail to satisfy equations (15) and (16) [the conditions of
their fundamental theorem]. The move can certainly not be logically
criticized on those grounds, even by believers in axioms 1-3. It is possible
that the chosen policy was optimal for the SDM's particular preferences,
and that those preferences satisfy the axioms."
Since we have mentioned Rawls's maximin criterion, it is worth noting
that Willig and Bailey are subject to a question (with an implied criticism)
which has frequently been directed at Rawls. It concerns the lexicographic
nature of their conditions. How large would the gains of the best-off
n — k people in the society have to be before one would be willing to
tolerate a very small loss (an s loss) in the well-being of the lowest-placed
k individuals? To put this another way, is there no conceivable ratio of
benefits to costs for society as a whole that would induce one to accept
an e loss in the partial sum of real-income changes for some group of
low-ranking consumers, where the ranking is, as throughout, by real
income? Perhaps the answer is that there is no such total benefit-cost
ratio that one would accept. But surely this question merits reflection,
for if such an overall benefit-cost ratio does exist, we should have some
doubts about how readily we can accept the Willig-Bailey axioms.
More generally, the article implicitly raises, but does not address, one
fundamental question. The analysis proceeds on the basis of an axiom
that sounds weak but is, in fact, quite strong (in the sense that it does a lot
of work in generating the results): axiom 3, which stipulates that the
social decisionmaker displays "regressive-transfer aversion." It states:
"At prices p°, the SDM does not find desirable any transfer of income
from a nominally poorer to a richer consumer." But the supposition
that the SDM has this view must be based on some conception on his
part of what the just distribution of income is and how the distribution
at prices p° compares with that just distribution. The paper provides us
with no underlying theory of the justice of the income distribution. ToComment on Willig and Bailey 111
ask that it provide one is, to be sure, to give the authors a large order to
fill. But without an appeal to some theory (be it an existing one or a new
one) of what ought to be, and how this compares with what is at any time,
it is difficult to evaluate how compelling the Willig-Bailey axioms are.
And, as Willig and Bailey recognize, any policy interest their results have
must ultimately depend on how compelling one finds the axioms that
lead to those results.
One should also ask whether the methodology presented in this paper
is, in fact, well suited for application to piecemeal regulatory policy
actions, or whether it is not better suited for evaluating complete social
structures and states of the world. A decision chosen because it is social-
welfare-dominating will generate a new set of nominal incomes and a
new set of prices p°, which will, in turn, serve as the basis for the next
piecemeal policy decision. The result of all these piecemeal policy steps
need not social-welfare-dominate the position from which we begin.
Alternatively, consider independent policy decisions being made simul-
taneously by different regulatory agencies, none of which takes into
account the changes any of the others is making. The fact that each agency
chooses a policy that social-welfare-dominates the status quo does not
guarantee that the sum total of these policy choices will social-welfare-
dominate the starting position.
While I think that both the implementation issues and the broader
questions I have raised about the Willig-Bailey analysis need attention
before their results can have substantial impact on policy decisions, the
authors have given us a very stimulating and thought-provoking paper.Comment
Richard Schmalensee
In this very interesting and well-written paper, Willig and Bailey propose,
defend, and apply a general test for the desirability of economic policies
that takes into account both the magnitude of net benefits and their
incidence. Their basic approach follows that used by Atkinson, by
Rothschild and Stiglitz, and by others in analysis of income-inequality
measures. (Thus, what is called "social-welfare dominance" here has
been called "Lorenz dominance" by Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett.)
Willig and Bailey consider a class of social-welfare functions that are
nondecreasing and symmetric in real incomes and have the property that
regressive transfers do not increase welfare. (It follows from work by
Rothschild and Stiglitz that this latter condition is implied by quasicon-
cavity of the welfare function, but it does not imply quasiconcavity.)
They show that in a society with n individuals, if a proposed policy would
lead to a new income distribution in which the total of the lowest k
incomes exceeds the same total in the existing distribution, for all k
between 1 and n, all social-welfare functions in this class would be in-
creased by adoption of the policy. The policy (or the income distribution
to which it gives rise) is said to dominate the status quo. If all these sums
would be lower with the policy in effect than in the status quo, all welfare
functions in their class would be lowered by adoption of the policy, and
the status quo dominates. If some sums are higher and some are lower,
neither situation dominates, and the desirability of the policy cannot be
determined without more information about the welfare function.
The stochastic dominance literature, to which this approach is inti-
mately formally related, suggests a simple illustration of this test. Suppose
that incomes are initially normally distributed across individuals, with
standard deviation am. A policy is proposed that would yield a normal
distribution of real net benefits across individuals, with mean 5, standard
deviation ob, and correlation pmb with initial incomes. Real incomes
after adoption of the policy would then also be normal. It is easy to show
that adotion of the proposed policy dominates the status quo in the Willig-
Bailey sense if and only if (a) b > 0 and (b) pmb < —ab/2am. If both these
inequalities are reversed, the status quo dominates. Condition (a) always
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as measured by the standard deviation of real incomes, not be increased.
If all individuals receive b > 0, condition (a) is satisfied, and both sides
of the inequality in (b) are zero. If different individuals receive different
benefits, so that ab is positive, benefits and initial income must be nega-
tively correlated if the policy is to dominate the status quo. Distaste for
risk in the stochastic dominance literature is formally equivalent to
distaste for inequality here.
Axiomatic welfare theory of the sort propounded in this paper is po-
tentially useful only to the extent that the axioms chosen reflect widely
held beliefs. If this is the case, it is at least conceivable that most policy-
makers could be persuaded to agree with the axioms, even if in advance
of such persuasion their behavior violated those axioms. (The analogy
with the axioms of expected utility theory is close but not exact, since,
as Willig and Bailey note, actors in the political process may have selfish
incentives to take actions that lower social welfare as they perceive it.)
From this perspective, axioms 2 and 3, though certainly as reasonable
as most in the literature, seem less than totally compelling. Since Professor
Klevorick examined axiom 3 at length, I will concentrate on axiom 2.
Suppose we are choosing between two proposed policies that affect only
two people: person R, who has initial income of $20,000, and person P,
who has initial income of $5,000. Policy 1 would give each $5,000 in net
benefits, while policy 2 would lower R's real income by $10,000 and raise
P's real income by $20,000. Since the two policies lead to the same ex
post income distribution, axiom 2 says that the social decisionmaker must
be indifferent between them. I would expect most policymakers to prefer
policy 1, however, thereby exhibiting what might be called change aver-
sion. In a real world where habits are not easily altered, there are costs
to imposing large shocks on society, but axiom 2 assumes those costs
away. Axiom 2 is compelling when one is evaluating hypothetical long-
run equilibria; it is less so when one is considering the actual short-run
impacts of proposed policies.
In order to apply the basic notions discussed above in a world of many
commodities, in which prices change, one needs a definition of real in-
come. As is well known, this concept has a unique meaning only under
special assumptions; there is a classic index-number problem here. Willig
and Bailey deal with this by choosing a single reference price vector, p°.
If the actual price vector is pj, they define a household's real income as
its money income plus the Hicksian equivalent variation associated with
a price change from p° to Pj. In much of the paper, p° is taken to be the
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comes exactly the ordinary equivalent variation. As Willig has shown
elsewhere, the choice of a reference price level and the choice between the
equivalent and compensating variations do not matter much when pol-
icies with small income effects are considered. But if income effects are
important enough that the Marshallian surplus approximation is ques-
tionable, these initial choices may affect the policy choices implied by
the analysis. Willig and Bailey take a reasonable route around the index-
number problem; they cannot eliminate it.
In the illustrative applications of their test, Willig and Bailey consider
total net gains to all individuals originally in various income classes,
rather than looking directly at distributions of individual incomes. That
is, the operational version of the test requires that the net gain of the
lowest income class be positive, that the total net gain of the lowest two
income classes be positive, and so on. This provides only an approximate
test, since policy may cause people to change income classes. To take an
extreme example, consider a society composed only of individuals R and
P, as described above. Suppose a policy would give $17,000 to P and take
$16,000 from R. This passes the operational test as defined above; the
gains to P are positive, and the gains to R and P together are positive.
But since R is now the low-income individual, with an income of $4,000,
it is clear that the new income distribution does not dominate the old.
For small changes, this sort of switching seems likely to be unimportant,
and there is no obvious way to deal with it in applications in which indi-
viduals cannot be considered directly. But a problem does remain in
principle when broad income classes are treated as individuals.
A few words on the potential applications of theorems 2 and 3 seem to
be in order. These theorems state that if aggregate net benefits are positive,
a sufficient condition for dominance (as defined above) is that there exist
some division of net benefits received by each income class into gross
benefits and costs such that the class-specific benefit-cost ratios decline
with income. But this is only a sufficient condition, and the division of
net benefits that does the trick need have no relation at all to the economic
meanings of the terms "benefit" and "cost."
In a two-person society, suppose that a number of prices are changed
on commodities consumed mainly by the poorer person, P. Suppose P
receives $10 in benefits from price reductions but loses $9 from price
increases. The richer person, R, gains $2 from the price cuts but loses $1
from price rises. The policy has produced a dominating income distribu-
tion, but the benefit-cost ratio is larger for the high-income R than for
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electricity pricing policies are presented that dominate the status quo but
do not have declining benefit-cost ratios. Table 2.3 shows a telephone
pricing policy with the same properties. If net benefits can be computed
in any application, information can only be lost by converting the results
to benefit-cost ratios. On the other hand, theorems 2 and 3 may be of
considerable value in situations in which qualitative information is avail-
able but a complete quantitative analysis is impossible.
Willig and Bailey clearly feel that their dominance criterion can be used
to improve actual regulatory policymaking. The pilot applications to
electricity and telephone pricing that they present shed some light on the
merit of this position. In testing for dominance, both studies employ data
on residential customers only. Income classes, rather than individuals,
are the focus of the analysis, and class-specific demand elasticities are
unavailable. The key data give consumption of the commodities con-
sidered by income class at initial prices. Data sets of this sort can presum-
ably be routinely constructed at moderate cost.
Using their proposition 1, Willig and Bailey show that these data can
support interesting analyses of the direct effects of price changes on re-
sidential customers. The basic tool amounts to a first-order approxima-
tion to consumer surplus changes. Suppose that it is proposed to change
a vector of prices from p to p + Ap. Let X,- be the vector of purchases of
these commodities by individuals in income class i at prices p. Then a
first-order approximation to the net benefits received by class i is simply
Bt = — (X,)'(Ap). As the Willig-Bailey paper shows, if the B( pass the
fundamental test for dominance (and if it can be assumed that households
do not switch income classes and that households with equal initial
incomes satisfy the conditions of proposition 1), then there exists a
positive constant, i, such that the actual net benefits of a change from
p to p + f(Ap) pass this same test as long as t is less than i. There is no
way to know if the original proposal passes this test (that is, to know if
t > 1) without income-class-specific demand elasticity information. Still,
this sort of local analysis can make at least a strong prima facie case for
or against proposed changes in prices paid by households.
However, in both pilot applications in the paper the proposed price
changes would also affect business customers. The tools presented by
Willig and Bailey do not help one to translate changes in firms' costs to
changes in real incomes of households in different income classes. These
latter changes, which may be important in many applications, must de-
pend on households' various roles as input suppliers and output demand-
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may seem plausible, for instance, that increased business telephone rates
ultimately fall more heavily on rich households than on poor ones. But
to demonstrate this quantitatively or even qualitatively in any particular
case would require an elaborate and expensive general equilibrium anal-
ysis. Thus, while it is comparatively simple to analyze in a useful way the
direct incidence of changes in prices that households pay, it is much
harder to assess the total or ultimate incidence of price changes that also
affect firms. It appears unlikely that the ultimate incidence of such changes
could be considered on a routine basis by regulatory agencies or regulated
firms unless new techniques of analysis are devised.
Difficulties of this same sort arise in principle even if one is concerned
only with efficiency, of course. In a second-best world, with distortions
elsewhere in the economy, precise measurement of the efficiency implica-
tions of any proposed price change becomes a very complex undertaking.
But, efficiency analysis is greatly simplified if the rest of the economy is
plausibly assumed to be approximately competitive. Simple pricing for-
mulas, such as the Ramsey rule that Willig and Bailey employ, follow
from this assumption. In analysis of incidence, however, the competitive
assumption does not seem to have similar power. Without tractable
methods for analyzing the ultimate incidence of price increases affecting
firms, the value of the Willig-Bailey methodology to actual decision-
makers is hard to judge.
Even if such methods are devised, problems arise when one considers
the consequences of requiring a number of regulatory (or other policy-
making) agencies to employ the Willig-Bailey tests. If a large number of
agencies attempt to make progressive redistributions, their actions may
have non-negligible effects on incentives to supply labor, to invest in skill
acquisition, and to supply capital. As the optimal income tax literature
has shown, incentive effects of this sort can substantially raise the optimal
level of inequality. While such second-order indirect effects of regulatory
policies might conceivably be well considered in especially creative aca-
demic analysis, regulatory agencies or regulated firms obviously could
not do so on a routine basis. Further, as the paper notes, it is possible
for two policies, neither of which dominates the status quo, to dominate
it if imposed as a package. But individual agencies can only make packages
that employ the instruments at their disposal. Suppose for the sake of
argument that it is possible to apply the Willig-Bailey test correctly, and
that regulators are instructed to adopt only dominant policies. Then two
potential policies of the sort described above, in the hands of separate
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of decisionmaking than seems imaginable. On the other hand, if agencies
are instructed only not to adopt dominated policies, a great deal of
analytical effort (beyond that necessary to compute total net benefits)
might be required per dominated policy detected. There is a case, I think,
for centralizing responsibility for equity and decentralizing responsibility
for efficiency.
The general message of this paper, that distributional effects deserve
consideration in policymaking, is hard to quarrel with. Willig and Bailey
propose an interesting and potentially usable test that considers such
effects. I give them very high marks both for topic selection and for
quality of output. Their tools permit one to assess the merit of changes
in prices paid by households in a relatively convincing fashion. The value
of their contribution would be greatly enhanced if similarly powerful
tools were forged for analysis of changes in prices paid by firms.